Construction and Surety Law by Reed, Toni Scott
SMU Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 3 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 11
2004
Construction and Surety Law
Toni Scott Reed
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Toni Scott Reed, Construction and Surety Law, 57 SMU L. Rev. 759 (2004)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol57/iss3/11
CONSTRUCTION AND SURETY LAW
Toni Scott Reed*
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 759
II. IMPLIED WARRANTY ISSUES IN CONSTRUCTION. 760
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ............................... 764
IV. LIEN RIGHTS, RETAINAGE, AND FUNDS
TRA PPIN G ............................................... 769
V. LIMITATIONS, THE DISCOVERY RULE, AND
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT ...................... 776
VI. ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND RIGHTS .............. 778
VII. CONTRACTOR LIABILITY FOR
SUBCONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEES .................... 785
VIII. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LIABILITY ACT ... 787
IX. THE SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE DOCTRINE... 789
X. CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS AND INSURANCE
COV ERA G E ............................................. 792
XI. PASS THROUGH CLAIMS .............................. 795
XII. PERFORMANCE BONDS AND THE MATERIAL
ALTERATION DOCTRINE ............................. 795
XIII. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS ...................... 797
I. INTRODUCTION
URING late 2002 and throughout 2003, the developments in
construction and surety law focused on a wide variety of substan-
tive issues, most notably including decisions regarding general
construction disputes, substantial completion, mechanic's liens, retainage
and trust fund claims, performance bond disputes, claims for liability for
subcontractor's employees, sovereign immunity, waiver of implied war-
ranties, and the enforceability of arbitration clauses. The Texas Supreme
Court remained quite active in the construction arena, issuing some im-
portant decisions on subjects including waiver of implied warranties, arbi-
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tration agreements and awards, and lien rights and retainage
requirements. The Texas Courts of Appeals issued a particularly large
number of decisions which directly impact the construction and surety
practitioner. A number of those decisions are discussed here. Very nota-
bly, the various courts of appeals had the opportunity to apply the rules
set forth in several of the Supreme Court decisions discussed in the last
two years' articles.
II. IMPLIED WARRANTY ISSUES IN CONSTRUCTION
In December 2002, the Texas Supreme Court issued its decision permit-
ting the waiver of the implied warranty of habitability and implied war-
ranty of good and workmanlike construction in Centex Homes v.
Buecher.1 In that case, the Texas Supreme Court determined that both
implied warranties can be waived under the proper circumstances, al-
though only the implied warranty of good workmanship was effectively
waived under the facts of the particular case.2 The opinion overruled the
holding of the San Antonio Court of Appeals, which is discussed in detail
below.
In Buecher v. Centex Homes,3 decided by the San Antonio Court of
Appeals in March 2000, the court held that a home builder would not be
permitted to require a purchaser to sign what the court described as a
"contract of adhesion," which waived the implied warranty of habitability
and good and workmanlike construction in the context of new home con-
struction.4 In its holding, the court supported the continued viability of
Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes.5 The court's reasoning was that it
would be incongruous if public policy required the existence of the im-
plied warranties, yet permitted the waiver or disclaimer of the warranties
in the form of a pre-printed statement form disclaimer in a standard form
contract. 6 The court rejected the builder's argument that Melody Home
prohibits the waiver of implied warranties only in the context of the re-
pair of tangible personal property.7
The homeowner argued that the waiver provision violated Section
17.46(b)(12) of the DTPA. Centex argued that the waiver was permissi-
ble because the homeowners would be adequately protected by the Resi-
dential Construction Liability Act. It also argued "that the waiver of
implied warranties should be permitted because the express warranties
provided in lieu of the implied warranties serve the 'gap filler' function
1. Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. 2002).
2. Id. at 268.
3. Buecher v. Centex Homes, 18 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet.
granted).
4. Id. at 810-11.
5. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1997) (holding that the
implied warranty to perform repair services in a good and workmanlike manner cannot be
waived).
6. Buecher, 18 S.W.3d at 808.
7. Id.
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which the implied warranties are designed to satisfy."'8
The San Antonio Court rejected Centex's arguments, citing the Texas
Supreme Court's adoption of implied warranty law relating to new home
construction from 1968, 9 as well as the law of Melody Homes. Based
upon those authorities, the San Antonio Court concluded that the reason-
ing expressed in those cases applied equally to new home construction.10
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court stated that it agreed with the San
Antonio Court of Appeals that the implied warranty of habitability can-
not be waived, except under limited circumstances not implicated in the
particular case before it.1 The court disagreed with the court of appeals'
conclusion that the implied warranty of good and workmanlike construc-
tion cannot be disclaimed, holding instead that when the parties' agree-
ment sufficiently describes the manner, performance, or quality of
construction, the express agreement may supercede the implied warranty
of good workmanship.12
In the case before the supreme court, Michael Buecher and other
homeowners purchased new homes built by Centex Homes or Centex
Real Estate Corporation. Each homeowner signed a form sale agree-
ment prepared by Centex, which contained the following disclaimer:
At closing Seller will deliver to purchaser, Seller's standard form of
homeowner's Limited Home Warranty against defects in workman-
ship and materials, a copy of which is available to Purchaser. PUR-
CHASER AGREES TO ACCEPT SAID HOMEOWNER'S
WARRANTY AT CLOSING IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WAR-
RANTIES, WHATSOEVER, WHETHER EXPRESSED OR IM-
PLIED BY LAW, AND INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF GOOD WORKMANLIKE
CONSTRUCTION AND HABITABILITY. PURCHASER AC-
KNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT SELLER IS RELYING
ON THIS WAIVER AND WOULD NOT SELL THE PROPERTY
TO PURCHASER WITHOUT THIS WAIVER. 13
Following the purchase of their homes, Buecher and others sued
Centex for fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, and violations of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis of the question of whether
and when implied warranties can be waived with a review of its decision
in Humber v. Morton,14 where the court originally recognized that a
builder of new homes impliedly warrants that the residence is constructed
in a good and workmanlike manner and is suitable for human habita-
8. Id. at 810.
9. Id. at 811 (citing Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)).
10. Id.
11. Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 268 (Tex. 2002).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
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tion.15 The court recalled that in imposing the warranties, which
superceded the concept of caveat emptor, it recognized both the signifi-
cance of the purchase of a new home for most buyers, as well as the diffi-
culty in discovering or guarding against latent defects in construction. 16
Next, the court discussed the development of the doctrines in its G-W-
L, Inc. v. Robichaux"7 opinion, where it established the rule that the
"Humber warranty" could be disclaimed or waived if that intent was
clearly expressed in the parties' agreement."'
Finally, the court addressed the impact of Melody Home Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Barnes19 on the implied warranties. In Melody Home, the su-
preme court recognized the implied warranty of good workmanship in
the repair or modification of tangible goods or property, and further held
that, as a matter of public policy, the implied warranty for repair services
could not be waived or disclaimed.20 The court's discussion in that case
noted the incongruity of requiring the creation of an implied warranty,
but permitting its waiver by a pre-printed, standard form, suggesting that
such disclaimers should not be allowed because they encouraged shoddy
workmanship. 21 At the conclusion of that opinion, the Texas Supreme
Court purported to overrule Robichaux "to the extent that it conflicts
with this opinion. '22
In the Buecher opinion, the supreme court noted that the meaning and
scope of the court's prior statement regarding overruling Robichaux was
ambiguous because it is not clear to what extent Robichaux and Melody
Home actually conflict, since they address different subject matters and
different implied warranties. 23 Because the holding of Melody Home had
cast some doubt regarding the validity of the Robichaux opinion, the su-
preme court re-visited its analysis in Robichaux.
In the context of the Robichaux case, which addressed an alleged de-
fective roof on a new home, the trial court rendered judgment for the
buyers, based upon a jury finding that the builder failed to construct the
roof in a good workmanlike manner, and that the home was not mer-
chantable at the time of completion. The supreme court reversed and
rendered judgment for the builder, holding that the implied "warranty of
merchantability" was a sales warranty under the UCC, which did not ap-
ply to a house.24 Further, the court determined that there were, based
upon the language in the sales documents, no warranties, express or im-
plied, of any kind, and that the written documents were sufficiently clear
15. Id. at 555.
16. Centex Homes, 95 S.W.3d at 269.
17. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
18. Id. at 393.
19. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
20. Id. at 354-55.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. 2002).
24. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982).
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to disclaim any implied warranty of habitability. 25 The court's opinion
did not distinguish between the separate warranties of habitability and
good workmanship, however. The analysis did not discuss any of the
public policy considerations for the implied warranty of habitability
either.
In Buecher, Centex Homes argued that the court should adhere to the
Robichaux holding, because it was consistent with the decisions from
other states allowing the disclaimer of implied warranties, which arise in
the context of a sale of a new home. The supreme court noted, after
reviewing the various states' opinions, that the cases either ignored the
implied warranty of habitability or treated it as part of the implied war-
ranty of good workmanship. 26 The court found that point important,
since Texas does recognize the implied warranty of good workmanship
and the implied warranty of habitability as separate warranties.
The supreme court concluded that the implied warranty of good work-
manship focuses on the builder's conduct, while the implied warranty of
habitability focuses on the state of the completed structure.27 The im-
plied warranty of good workmanship recognizes that a home builder must
perform with at least a minimal standard of care, and requires the builder
to construct a home in the same manner as would a generally proficient
builder engaged in similar work under similar circumstances. 28 The court
noted that the implied warranty of good workmanship is a "gap-filler" or
"default warranty" and applies unless and until the parties express a con-
trary intention.29
In contrast, the implied warranty of habitability looks at the finished
product and is more limited in scope, protecting the buyer from those
defects that undermine the basis of the bargain.30 In essence, it requires
the builder to provide a home that is safe, sanitary, and fit for human
habitation, and it protects the buyer from conditions that are so defective
that the property would be unsuitable for its intended use as a home.31
The court noted that the two warranties do parallel one another and
may overlap in certain circumstances, since a builder's inferior workman-
ship may render a home unsafe. 32 It also noted carefully the reason for
the separate existence of the warranties and the public policy underlying
the implied warranty of habitability. The court emphasized that the
Humber warranties were originally created in order to protect the aver-
age homebuyer who lacks the expertise to discover latent construction
defects. In defining the way it would ultimately separate the warranties,
the court concluded that while "the parties are free to define for them-
25. Id. at 393.
26. Centex Homes, 95 S.W.3d at 272.
27. Id. at 272-73.







selves the quality of workmanship, there is generally no substitute for
habitability." 33
Therefore, the court held that the warranty of habitability is an essen-
tial part of a new home sale and that the warranty of habitability can be
waived only to the extent that defects are adequately disclosed to the
buyer.34 The court's example of where the waiver might apply was in the
context of a sale of a problem home, where the buyer had express and full
knowledge of defects that might affect its habitability. The court's ulti-
mate conclusion was that the implied warranty of habitability, which ex-
tends to latent defects only, cannot be disclaimed generally, but does not
apply to known defects, even substantial ones, which are disclosed to the
buyer. 35
In contrast, the court found that the implied warranty of good work-
manship defines the level of performance expected when the parties do
not expressly define that standard in their contract, and functions as a
"gap-filler" in that respect. 36 As a result of that analysis, the court found
that the parties can have an agreement which supersedes the "gap-filler"
or implied warranty, but cannot simply disclaim it.37 Therefore, the im-
plied warranty of good workmanship may be impacted or overridden
when the "agreement provides for the manner, performance, or quality of
the desired construction. ' 38
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The issue of sovereign immunity, and the application of the various
administrative proceedings which have been created by statute, were dis-
cussed by various courts of appeals during 2003 against the backdrop of
recent Texas Supreme Court opinions on such topics. Those opinions
continued to apply general rules regarding the "no waiver by conduct"
concept, but one significant opinion also demonstrated that exceptions do
exist.
The most significant cases from 2001 and 2002 set the stage for the
decisions during the past year. The 2001 opinion in General Services
Commission v. Little-Tex Insulation Co.39 focused first on the issue of
waiver by conduct, specifically the argument by contractors that the state
waived immunity by merely accepting the benefits of the contract. In that
case, the court concluded that under the new scheme set forth in Chapter
2260 of the Government Code, "a party simply cannot sue the State for
breach of contract absent legislative consent under Chapter 107. Compli-
ance with Chapter 2260, therefore, is a necessary step before a party can
33. Id. at 274.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 274-75.
36. Id. at 274.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 275.
39. Gen. Servs. Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2001).
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petition to sue the State."'40
The Texas Supreme Court adopted a consistent approach in 2002 in
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy.41 The is-
sue presented in the case was whether IT-Davy, a general contractor,
could sue the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
("TNRCC"), a state agency, for breach of contract, where IT-Davy ar-
gued that it had fully performed under its contract, but the TNRCC did
not fully pay for services it accepted. The supreme court concluded that
merely accepting the benefits of a contract is not sufficient to establish
waiver. 42 In its conclusion, the court noted again its "one route to the
courthouse" rule and emphasis on legislative consent.43 However, the
concurring opinion by Justice Hecht contains perhaps the most significant
analysis, and perhaps a hint about the future direction of the analysis of
sovereign immunity. The concurrence stated that it agreed with the ulti-
mate holding of the court, but disagreed with the broad language used by
Justice Baker in the majority opinion. Justice Hecht noted that he
doubted "whether governmental immunity from suit for breach of con-
tract can be applied so rigidly," but declined to decide any broader issues
not presented by the facts of the case, as follows: 44
In his opinion for the Court in Federal Sign v. Texas Southern Univer-
sity, Justice Baker noted that there may be "circumstances where the
State may waive its immunity by conduct other than simply execut-
ing a contract so that it is not always immune from suit when it con-
tracts." In his opinion today, he appears to have abandoned this
view, stating that "allowing... governmental entities to waive immu-
nity by conduct that includes accepting benefits under a contract
would be fundamentally inconsistent with our established jurispru-
dence." He does not explain this about-face. The Court was correct
in Federal Sign. As one example, it has long been held that the State
can waive immunity by filing suit. There may be others, such as debt
obligations. We need not here decide the issue for all time, any more
than we needed to in Federal Sign.45
A. WAIVER THROUGH FILING SUIT
A key exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity doctrine was the
basis of a recent Austin Court of Appeals case which was argued in late
2003 and decided in January 2004. In that case, the court held that the
State does waive sovereign immunity when the State, as plaintiff, files a
case in district court, and the defendant in the case files a compulsory
40. Id. at 598.
41. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002).
42. Id. at 857.
43. Id. at 860.
44. Id.




counterclaim. 46 The facts of the case involved a Texas Department of
Transportation ("TxDOT") project, where the original contractor,
Sedona, was terminated by TxDOT. The surety, Fidelity and Deposit
Company ("F&D"), completed the project, after receiving demand by
TxDOT to complete under the performance bond. At the completion of
the project, TxDOT sued F&D, seeking to recover additional costs on the
project which TxDOT claimed that it had incurred. F&D counterclaimed
for breach of the same contract which was the subject of TxDOT's claims
to recover damages it incurred during its performance under the contract
and bond.
The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction, finding that
the State had waived sovereign immunity, and specifically immunity from
suit, by filing the case in the district court. By its actions, the trial court
held that the State subjected itself to the filing of counterclaims which
were related to or germane to the State's original claims. In analyzing the
issue, the Austin Court of Appeals specifically noted that a well-accepted
exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine is waiver by filing suit
where the state is the plaintiff in a case filed in district court. The court's
language on this issue was clear and forceful:
We acknowledge and reaffirm that it is the legislature's sole province
to waive or abrogate sovereign immmunity. But just as Texas courts
have adhered to this general rule for over a century, they have also
recognized an exception to this rule-when the State initiates suit. It
is well established that the State's initiation of suit is an exception to
sovereign immunity from suit clearly recognized by Texas courts.47
The Austin Court of Appeals also specifically referred to the concur-
ring opinion by Justice Hecht in the IT Davy case discussed above in
reaching its holding. Further, the court rejected the State's arguments
that the State sued F&D as a surety, but F&D counterclaimed as a com-
pleting contractor. The Court held that the arguments were unpersuasive
and that the claims and counterclaims related to additional expenses and
costs incurred by the various parties in connection with the construction
project.48
Finally, the Austin Court held that the administrative process, under
Section 201.112 of the Transportation Code, which the State tried to im-
pose upon F&D, was not a proper administrative procedure, because, by
statute, the procedure was limited in its application to highway projects.
Because the project in question was a building, not a highway, which is
defined to include "a public road or part of a public road and a bridge,
culvert, or other necessary structure related to a public road, '49 Section
201.112 did not apply. As a result, the court concluded that F&D had no
46. State v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 127 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no
pet. h.).
47. Id. at 343.
48. Id. at 344-45.
49. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 221.001 (Vernon 1999).
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administrative remedy to exhaust.50
B. No WAIVER THROUGH THE "SUE AND BE SUED" LANGUAGE
In Satterfield & Pontikes Construction, Inc. v. Irving Independent
School District,51 the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the issue of sov-
ereign immunity in the context of a local school district. The Irving
School District contracted with Satterfield for the construction of a new
middle school. During construction, the project encountered various de-
lays in completion. At the end of the project, the contractor sued the
school district for additional compensation for the project and for an ex-
tension of the completion time.
The contractor argued that the school district waived sovereign immu-
nity, particularly the immunity from suit, by the terms of Section 11.151
of the Texas Education Code, which provides as follows:
(a) The trustees of an independent school district constitute a body
corporate and in the name of the district may acquire and hold real
and personal property, sue and be sued, and receive bequests and
donations or other moneys or funds coming legally into their
hands. 52
The Dallas Court rejected the contractor's interpretation of the statute,
concluding that the language merely speaks to a district's capacity to sue
and its capacity to be sued in the event that immunity has been otherwise
waived. 53 The court concluded that, at a minimum, the statute was am-
biguous as to the legislature's intent to waive a district's liability from
suit, and the court was therefore required to construe the statute in a
manner to protect the district's immunity.54 Judge Lang of the Dallas
Court authored a lengthy and detailed dissent to the opinion, arguing
that the trial court incorrectly granted the plea to the jurisdiction based
upon the development of sovereign immunity law. 55
C. THE TAKINGS CLAIM ARGUMENTS
In N.C. Sturgeon, L.P. v. Sul Ross State University,56 the Austin Court
of Appeals addressed a waiver by conduct argument and an alternative
takings claim by a contractor in the context of a construction project.
During construction on the project, Sul Ross University withheld funds
and then terminated the contract. Sturgeon sued, arguing breach of con-
tract and a governmental taking. The university answered with a plea to
50. Fid. & Deposit Co., 127 S.W.3d at 347.
51. Satterfield & Pontikes Constr., Inc. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 123 S.W.3d 63 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
52. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.151(a) (Vernon 1996).
53. Satterfield, 123 S.W.3d at 66 (citing City of Dallas v. Reata Construction Corp., 83
S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002), reversed, 47 Tex. Sup. J. 408 (Tex. 2004)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 69 (Lang, J. dissenting).
56. N.C. Sturgeon, L.P. v. Sul Ross State Univ., No. 03-01-00716-CV, 2003 Tex. App.
LEXIS 331, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 16, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. The court affirmed, re-
jecting the arguments of Sturgeon regarding waiver by conduct and a tak-
ings claim.57
Sturgeon's brief was actually filed prior to the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in IT Davy on the issue of waiver by conduct. The Austin Court
of Appeals summarily rejected all of Sturgeon's arguments on that issue,
holding that the supreme court had previously rejected all such concepts
in the IT Davy decision.58 The Austin Court declined Sturgeon's invita-
tion to reconsider the supreme court's decision based upon Sturgeon's
position that the supreme court's reasoning was "fundamentally
wrong." 59
In Sturgeon's second ground for appeal, it argued that the university
had committed a governmental taking when it refused to pay the full con-
tract price and terminated the contract. Sturgeon argued that it estab-
lished a prima facie case of bad faith by the university.
The Austin Court began its discussion by reciting the rule that a party
seeking to sue the State must show that the State's immunity from suit
has been waived by express consent. 60 The court also noted, however,
that a party suing for a constitutional taking does not have to show waiver
of sovereign immunity before bringing suit.61 That rule exists because a
constitutional takings claim rests on the idea that, although the State has
the right to take or use any property it needs to fulfill a public use, the
State must pay just compensation to the property owner.62 In order to
recover under a takings claim, the claimant must establish that the State
(1) intentionally acted in a manner which (2) resulted in the "taking" of
property (3) for public use.63 With respect to the first element, it is not
sufficient to show that the State was negligent because intent to take or
intent to perform the act which caused the harm is required.64
The Austin Court also outlined other standards for a takings claim, in-
cluding that (1) in a contract, if the State acts within procedures set forth
in the contract for withholding of materials, there is no intent to take; (2)
if the State acts within a color of right to take or withhold property in a
contract, there is no intent to take; and (3) if the State has a good faith
belief that it is justified in withholding property or payment due to disa-
greement over performance, there is no intent to take.65 In the context of
a pleading for a takings claim, the court noted that conclusory allegations
57. Id.
58. Id. at *3.
59. Id. at *2.
60. Id. at *4.
61. Id. (citing Texas State Employees Union/CWA Local 6184 v. Texas Workforce
Comm'n, 16 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.)).
62. Id. at *5 (quoting Green Int'l, Inc. v. State, 877 S.W.2d 428, 433 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1994, writ dism'd)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *6.
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of bad faith do not constitute proof of bad faith.66
Sturgeon's factual allegations in its pleadings were detailed and spe-
cific, stating all of the background information regarding the university's
requirement of Sturgeon to perform corrective work, its withholding of
funds, and its eventual termination of Sturgeon. The factual allegations
also stated that the university had acted in bad faith and in disregard for
the facts and for expert opinions with respect to the rejection of the work
and failure to pay for work.
After reviewing the detailed pleadings, the Austin Court noted that the
real dispute appeared to be the question of whether the masonry work on
the project was in fact defective, and whether the university rightly or
wrongly withheld full payment. The court noted that those disputes were
inherently related to the provisions of the contract. Based upon that con-
clusion, the court held that "[aittempting to evade the reach of sovereign
immunity by casting the dispute in terms of a takings claim does not
change the inherent character of the contract dispute, and a party suing
for breach of contract must obtain an express waiver of the State agency's
immunity from sUit."' 6 7 The court also concluded that the university's
pleadings indicated that it believed it was acting under its contractual
rights and that the university lacked the intent to take Sturgeon's
property. 68
IV. LIEN RIGHTS, RETAINAGE , AND FUNDS TRAPPING
During 2003, the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas Courts of
Appeals were very active in construing the Texas Property Code's provi-
sions relating to lien rights, retainage, and funds trapping, as well as the
law relating to constitutional lien rights.
A. LIEN RIGHTS AND RETAINAGE
In two companion cases issued in 2003, Page v. Structural Wood Com-
ponents, Inc. 69 and Page v. Marton Roofing, Inc.,70the Texas Supreme
Court addressed the issues of lien rights, retainage, and funds trapping,
and reversed the decision of a Houston Court of Appeals on those issues.
The two cases shared underlying facts, which involved a 1997 oral con-
tract between Page and Custom Concrete to remodel and expand a build-
ing in Houston for $300,000. Page made periodic payments to Custom
Concrete totaling $270,000. Marton Roofing ("MRI") was a subcontrac-
tor on the project. MRI completed its portion of the work on the project
in March 1998. In April 1998, the contractor demanded that Page ad-
vance additional funds to complete the work, but Page refused and termi-
nated the contract.
66. Id. at *8.
67. Id. at *16.
68. Id. at *17.
69. Page v. Structural Wood Components, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. 2003).
70. Page v. Marton Roofing, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. 2003).
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Page then hired replacement contractors to complete the work and
paid them a total of $30,657. The project was completed in full in July
1998, and the last payment was made at that time. When the original
contractor failed to pay MRI, MRI sent notices of claims for more than
$26,000 to the owner and contractors. MRI filed an affidavit for a
mechanic's lien on June 15, 1998, and provided a copy to the owner. Both
parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court entered judg-
ment in favor of MRI. Page then appealed, arguing that the trial court
erred in concluding that MRI timely filed a perfected lien and complied
with the fund-trapping provisions of the Texas Property Code. 71
Because the contract at issue was entered into in 1997, the Houston
court analyzed the version of the Property Code in effect at that time,
noting that the owner was required to retain ten percent of the contract
price for thirty days after work was completed and that a claimant can
perfect a lien on the retained funds if he provides the proper notices and
files an affidavit claiming a lien not later than the thirtieth day after the
work is completed. While the parties acknowledge that MRI sent a
proper notice and that Page properly retained funds on the project, they
disagreed about whether the affidavit was timely filed.
The Houston Court of Appeals, which analyzed the Property Code,
applied the statutory definitions of the terms "work" and "completion,"
noting that work is any part of construction performed under an original
contract, and that completion means "the actual completion of the work,
including any extras or change orders reasonably required or contem-
plated under the original contract, other than.warranty or repair work."' 72
Page contended that work was completed when the original contractor
demanded additional funds and the owner terminated it in April 1998.
MRI contended that completion occurred in July 1998, when the other
subcontractors completed the scope of work outlined in the original con-
tract. The Houston Court of Appeals originally held that completion oc-
curred in July 1998, when all of the work was concluded (regardless of the
party who performed it), and that MRI's lien was timely filed. The Hous-
ton Court also concluded that nothing in the Property Code prevents a
subcontractor from perfecting a lien separate from the original contrac-
tor's on retainage and that because the fund-trapping provisions have
been held to benefit the subcontractor separate and apart from the con-
tract, the lien was valid.73
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the holding of the Houston
Court, as set forth in its two companion opinions. In the two decisions,
the supreme court held that "work must be defined in relation to a partic-
71. Page v. Marton Roofing, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 750, 751 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, rev'd, 102 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. 2003).
72. Id. at 751-52 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.001(14), 53.106(e) (Vernon
1995)).
73. Id. at 752-54.
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ular contract" in order to determine the meaning of completion.74 The
court also noted that the greater weight of authority supported Page's
contention that work ends when a contract is terminated. 75 As a result of
its interpretation, the court concluded that a subcontractor must file its
lien affidavit within thirty days of the time that the original contract is
completed, terminated, or abandoned. Because MRI filed its affidavit
two months after the original contract on the project was terminated,
MRI's affidavit was untimely and did not perfect a lien on retainage.
The supreme court rejected the contention that a subcontractor must
be able to rely upon the completion of work initially contemplated under
the original contract in order to know when the thirty-day period begins
to run, cautioning subcontractors that the best way to proceed is to file a
lien affidavit within thirty days of completing their own work to be on the
safe side.76 The court's decision also pointed out that the Texas courts
have long recognized that contract modifications, including termination,
can change the amount of funds required to be retained and that it was
consistent to say that contract modifications can also change the work
contemplated by the contract and the retainage period. 77
The supreme court also determined that MRI's attempt to perfect a
fund-trapping lien failed for similar reasons. The court found that it was
undisputed that Page neither made nor owed any further payments to the
original contractor at the time after Page received notice of MRI's claims.
Once again, the court held that fund-trapping liens must be judged in
relation to individual original contracts, just as retainage liens.78 MRI's
notice authorized Page to withhold funds from the original contractor
who had hired MRI. Page was not authorized to withhold funds from
replacement contractors with no relationship to MRI. Accordingly, the
court found that Page could not be liable under any fund-trapping stat-
utes for funds paid to replacement contractors.79
B. LIEN RIGHTS AGAINST SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER
In Texas Wood Mill Cabinets, Inc. v. Butter,80 the Tyler Court of Ap-
peals addressed the question of constructive notice of a mechanic's lien
and the date of completion of underlying construction. In April 1999,
D&D Construction asked Texas Wood Mill Cabinets ("TWM") to design
and bid on cabinets for a spec home constructed on property which D&D
owned. On April 5, TWM Cabinets made the required measurements,
and it later entered into a contract to provide the cabinets. Installation
74. Page v. Marton Roofing, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 733, 734 (Tex. 2003); Page v. Structural
Wood Components, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 720, 721 (Tex. 2003).
75. Structural Wood Components, 102 S.W.3d at 723.
76. Id. at 725.
77. Id. at 725-26.
78. Page v. Marton Roofing, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Tex. 2003).
79. Id.




began in May 1999, and additional work was completed on June 17 and
July 5.
On June 18, the Butters agreed to purchase the home from D&D and
signed a contract for the purchase. The transaction closed on July 6.
D&D did not pay TWM, and TWM filed a mechanic's lien affidavit on
October 11, 1999 and served copies on both the Butters and D&D. On
September 1, 2000, TWM sued the Butters to foreclose the lien. The But-
ters filed a general denial and argued they were subsequent purchasers
without actual or constructive notice of TWM's lien.
After a non-jury trial, the court entered judgment for the Butters, with
certain factual findings, included the following: (1) the debt of $12,884.84
was reasonable for the cabinet work and was due and owing to TWM; (2)
TWM timely filed its lien affidavit; (3) the lien affidavit was properly per-
fected and related back to April 1999; (4) the Butters, as bona fide pur-
chasers without actual or constructive knowledge of the cabinet work,
were not bound by the lien; (5) though the Butters acquired the property
subject to the lien right, TWM was not entitled to foreclose unless the
Butters had either actual or constructive knowledge of the work or lien;
(6) the Butters' personal knowledge that the work was new construction
and that the improvements were made shortly before the July closing did
not constitute constructive knowledge; (7) the Butters did not have actual
or constructive knowledge of TWM's constitutional lien at the time of the
purchase. 81
TWM, on appeal, argued that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port the finding that there was no actual or constructive notice of the lien
right and that TWM's contract was completed in June 1999. The Butters
argued that the lien affidavit was not timely filed.
The Tyler court first addressed the question of whether Section 53.052
(a) or (b) governed the dispute, since the construction at issue was a spec
home. 82 Subsection (a) of the Texas Property Code requires a lien affida-
vit to be filed not later than the fifteenth day of the fourth calendar
month after the indebtedness accrues, whereas subsection (b), which ap-
plies to residential construction, sets a deadline of the third calendar
month.83 The court carefully noted that a "residential construction pro-
ject" means a project for the construction or repair of a new or existing
residence provided by a "residential construction contract. '84 Because
the house in question was a spec home, the court concluded that the work
was not constructed under a "residential construction contract. '' 85 As a
result, the fourth month deadline applied, not the third month deadline.
With respect to the question of when TWM's work was completed, the
court referred to the ordinary meaning of the term "completed," which it
81. Id. at 101-02.
82. Id. at 103.
83. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.052 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
84. Tex. Wood Mill Cabinets, Inc., 117 S.W.3d at 103 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 53.001(10) (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
85. Id.
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held to mean "ended" or "concluded. ' 86 Because the purpose of the con-
tract between TWM and D&D was to construct and install cabinets, the
contract was not completed until the cabinets were constructed, installed,
and functional. In that context, the court held that initial construction did
not constitute a completed installation. Rather, the work in adjustments
to the cabinets in June and July constituted part of the required work, and
work was therefore not completed until the final actions in July. The
court noted that in July, TWM performed adjustments to the cabinets so
that they were in compliance with the contract requirements and that no
other work occurred after July.87 The Tyler Court of Appeals therefore
concluded that work was completed in July and sustained TWM's point of
appeal.88
The court then conducted a very detailed analysis of the issues of no-
tice and the impact of a lien right against a subsequent purchaser. The
court's discussion began with a reference to the constitutional lien which
is granted to an original contractor under the Texas Constitution, which
the court noted is self-executing. 89 The court also noted, however, that a
constitutional lien will not be enforced against a subsequent purchaser
who has neither actual nor constructive notice of the lien. 90
In that context, the court held that, in order for a contractor with a
constitutional lien to protect his rights against a third party, the contrac-
tor must comply with the statutes relating to affidavits for fixing a
mechanic's lien, thus giving constructive notice to third parties or giving
actual notice to third parties within the time limits set by statute (and that
lien will relate back to the inception of work on the contract). 91 The
court outlined two separate rules of notice: (1) when a lien affidavit is
filed after the sale of the property by the owner who contracted for the
improvements, the purchaser is deemed to have constructive notice of a
contractor's right to assert a lien for the statutory period, even when the
filing period began before the purchase occurred; and (2) personal knowl-
edge of the improvements made to the property at or shortly before the
time of the purchase provides sufficient notice of a contractor's right to
assert a lien.92
Because a purchaser has the burden to establish an affirmative defense
of lack of knowledge, the court reviewed the evidence presented at trial.
The purchaser testified that he was not a party to D&D's contract with
TWM, that he obtained a title search before his purchase which revealed
no liens, that he checked with D&D to determine if D&D owed money to
anyone for work, that D&D told the purchasers that all bills were paid in
full, that at closing D&D provided an affidavit stating that there were no
86. Id. at 103-04.
87. Id. at 104-05.







unpaid labor or materials claims, and that the purchaser was not aware
that anyone had a right to file a lien. Based upon all of the evidence at
trial, the court determined that the Butters did in fact have constructive
notice of TWM's right to assert a lien, pointing to the fact that the Butters
first saw the house when it was under construction and had knowledge
that work continued between the time they saw the house in June and
when they closed in July. 93 The court found that the evidence established
that the purchasers had actual knowledge of ongoing work in June 1999,
and that such knowledge was sufficient to charge the Butters with con-
structive knowledge of a right to assert lien claims.
The court rejected the Butters' arguments that prior cases had imputed
constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser only where work was per-
formed by the lien claimant at or after the date the purchaser took pos-
session of the property or where the purchaser knew the identity of the
contractor. 94 Rather, the court took a liberal approach to the concept,
holding that it is a public policy to liberally construe mechanic's lien
rights to protect laborers and materialmen.95 Because TWM's lien affida-
vit was timely filed and because the court concluded that the Butters had
constructive knowledge of a right to assert a lien, the court of appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court. 96
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LIENS
In San Antonio Credit Union v. O'Connor,97 the San Antonio Court
of Appeals confirmed that no jury questions are required in order to find
a constitutional mechanic's lien. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Jennings en-
tered into a construction contract with Laco Construction. During the
project, the parties encountered disagreements over payments due and
work performed. The parties asserted various claims against one another,
which were tried to a jury. The jury found in favor of Laco, and the trial
court imposed a constitutional lien upon the property and issued a judg-
ment for an order of sale to satisfy the lien. 98
On appeal, the Jennings argued that the court's judgment was improper
because the issue of the constitutional lien was not submitted to the jury.
The jury had answered a question of whether the Jennings failed to com-
ply with the written agreement with Laco affirmatively and found that
Laco sustained damages of $33,000. Laco had claimed a constitutional
lien in its pleading.
93. Id.
94. Id. (distinguishing Valdez v. Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co., 842 S.W.2d 273
(Tex. 1992) and Inman v. Clark, 485 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1972,
no writ)).
95. Id. at 106.
96. Id.
97. San Antonio Credit Union v. O'Connor, 115 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. App-San Antonio
2003, pet. denied).
98. Id. at 107.
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The Jennings argued that the question regarding the value of services
used to complete the house and whether Laco had been paid for provid-
ing those services should have been submitted to the jury. The court re-
jected those arguments, holding that because a constitutional mechanic's
lien is self-executing, it is automatic, and there are no issues which are
necessary for a jury to determine relating to the lien itself.99 The court
concluded that "[b]eyond proof of the fact of the existence of the debt,
which was found by the jury, and the fact of the labor having been per-
formed, [which is undisputed,] there was no way of submitting the ques-
tion of constitutional lien to the jury. '1 00
D. FUNDS TRAPPING
In In re Waterpoint Int'l, 0 1 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed
the issue of funds trapping in the context of a case involving Exchanger
Contractors, a subcontractor, which was not paid for its work by the con-
tractor, Waterpoint International. Exchanger filed a declaratory judg-
ment action seeking a determination of its rights under the trust fund
provisions of the Texas Property Code for funds which were owed to the
contractor by the owner. The contractor's lender, which held a security
interest in the contractor's receivable from the owner, also sought relief.
The Fifth Circuit Court affirmed the holding of the trial court that the
lender was exempt from the trust fund provisions.10 2
Exchanger's claim requested that the court adjudicate Exchanger's
rights to receivables owed by the owner to Waterpoint, upon which
Waterpoint's lender claimed an interest. The lender argued that Ex-
changer had no claim to a portion of the receivable because lenders are
specifically exempted by Chapter 162 of the Property Code. In the con-
text of the disputes, the court examined both lien rights under Chapter 53
of the Texas Property Code and trust funds under Chapter 162 of the
Property Code. The court pointed out that a subcontractor must comply
with the filing requirements and deadlines under Chapter 53 of the Prop-
erty Code in order to enforce rights against the property and property
owner.10 3 In contrast, the provisions of Chapter 162 provide that con-
struction payments to contractors or subcontractors under a construction
contract are deemed to be trust funds held for the benefit of laborers,
without regard to the laborers' compliance with Chapter 53.104 Chapter
162 was intended to serve as a special protection for subcontractors in
situations where contractors refuse to pay subcontractors for labor or
materials and imposes fiduciary responsibilities upon contractors to en-
99. Id. at 107.
100. Id. at 107-08 (quoting Weimhold v. Hyde, 294 S.W. 899, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1927, no writ)).
101. In re Waterpoint Int'l, LLC, 330 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2003).
102. Id. at 341.
103. Id. at 344.
104. Id. at 345.
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sure that subcontractors are paid.105
The court also noted, however, the Section 162.004 states that Chapter
162 does not apply to a bank or other lender. Additionally, Chapter 162
does not permit a subcontractor to "trap" funds still in the hands of an
owner as trust funds. Accordingly, the court rejected the arguments of
Exchanger. 106
V. LIMITATIONS, THE DISCOVERY RULE, AND
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
The San Antonio Court of Appeals had the opportunity during 2003 to
review, in depth, the issue of limitations, the applicability of the discovery
rule in the context of a construction dispute, and the impact of fraudulent
concealment and intentional misrepresentations by a contractor. In
Booker v. Real Homes, Inc.,107 the court reviewed the limitations issues in
the context of a summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of
the contractor, reversing in part and affirming in part.
The defendant contractor, Real Homes, built a residence for the Book-
ers, installing windows manufactured by a co-defendant, Marvin Win-
dows. Construction continued on the house throughout 1997, although
the Bookers moved into the residence in late 1996. As a result of con-
struction defects, water began to seep into the house through and around
the windows. Real Homes's summary judgment evidence indicated that
the Bookers complained about leaks around windows as early as Septem-
ber 1997.
According to the Bookers' summary judgment evidence, they noticed a
musty odor in their home in November 1997, which Real Homes investi-
gated in January and April 1998, but took no action. In June 1998, the
Bookers sent a certified letter to Real Homes, demanding that the issue
be addressed. In September 1998, Real Homes removed sheetrock and
found water damage and mold. In November 1998, Real Homes per-
formed a water test and determined that the windows were the source of
the water infiltration.
Real Homes and Marvin began to perform repairs in November 1998,
and work continued until January or February 1999. Although the Book-
ers were told that the problem had been repaired, the musty odor re-
turned. The Bookers sent a letter about the odor to Real Homes in April
1999. Real Homes responded that the odor was coming from outside the
house and took no further action. In July 1999, the Bookers cut a hole in
a wall beneath the windows in a room and discovered wet and rotten
wood.
On October 13, 1999, the Bookers filed suit against Real Homes and
Marvin, alleging contract and warranty theories, negligence, negligent
105. Id.
106. Id. at 349.
107. Booker v. Real Homes, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet.
denied).
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misrepresentation, and violations of the DTPA. The defendants moved
for summary judgment, arguing that the causes of action for negligence,
gross negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and violations of the DTPA were barred by the two-
year limitations period. The trial court granted the motion, and the
Bookers appealed.108
In its discussion regarding the standard for summary judgment, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals reiterated the well-accepted principles that a
defendant seeking summary judgment based upon limitations must estab-
lish when the cause of action accrued and must negate the application of
the discovery rule if pled by the non-movant. 10 9 The discovery rule ap-
plies where an injured party did not and could not know of its injury at
the time it occurred, and where the injury was inherently undiscoverable.
Under the discovery rule, the limitations period does not begin to run
when the first damage is observed or when the full extent of damage is
known, but rather when the injured party knew or should have known of
the facts giving rise to a cause of action.110
The Bookers argued that the limitations period did not begin until they
knew of the exact cause of the leaks, not just about the leaks themselves,
but the court disagreed, holding that all that was required was the discov-
ery of an injury and its general cause, not a specific cause. Under the
facts of the case, the court concluded that limitations was tolled until the
date when the Bookers actually knew about the leaks."' Because the
Bookers pled the discovery rule, it was the burden of the other parties to
establish when the Bookers discovered, or should have discovered, the
injury. The evidence indicated that the Bookers were aware of leaks in
the windows as early as September 1997, and therefore the court held
that limitations began to run then. 112
The Bookers also alleged that the builder fraudulently concealed and
intentionally misrepresented the true facts of the problems to them. The
court noted that fraudulent concealment estops a defendant from using
limitations as a defense and that it is the burden of the plaintiff to raise
the issue because it is an affirmative defense to limitations. Under Texas
law, to show that fraudulent concealment applies, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant had actual knowledge of the wrong, a duty to disclose
the wrong, and a fixed purpose to conceal the wrong.1 13 The doctrine of
fraudulent concealment suspends the running of the limitations period
after it has begun because the defendant concealed facts necessary for the
plaintiff to know that a claim existed, but the estoppel effect is not per-
manent.114 Knowledge of facts which would cause a reasonable person to
108. Id. at 490.
109. Id. at 491.
110. Id. at 491-92.
111. Id. at 492.





inquire and discover a concealed condition then becomes the equivalent
of knowledge of the injury for limitations purposes. Based upon the evi-
dence in the record, the court reversed summary judgment in favor of
Real Homes on the basis of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. 115
VI. ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND RIGHTS
During late 2002 and 2003, the Texas courts were very busy analyzing
issues associated with arbitration provisions, and they issued a number of
opinions regarding those issues. During that time period, the Texas Su-
preme Court issued various opinions analyzing the issue of arbitration
agreements within the context of construction disputes. In those deci-
sions, the supreme court emphasized the binding nature of arbitration,
the broad powers of the arbitrators, the courts' very limited powers of
review, and the parties' rights under that form of alternative dispute reso-
lution. In addition, various courts of appeals issued opinions regarding
the way arbitration clauses would be applied.
A. ARBITRATION AWARDS NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW, EXCEPT ON
LIMITED GROUNDS
In Callahan & Associates v. Orangefield Independent School District,1 16
the Texas Supreme Court outlined the extremely limited authority which
any trial court or appeals court has in reviewing an arbitration award.
The opinion emphasizes the very broad powers of the arbitrator in a case
which requires arbitration, and the fact that parties likely have no re-
course in the courts for legal errors committed by an arbitrator.
In the case, the school district hired Callahan, an architectural firm, to
provide architectural services for the construction of an elementary
school. The contract described both "basic" and "additional" services,
and it required the school district to pay Callahan specified fees for both.
The contract also required arbitration for any disputes that arose. After
the project was substantially complete, the district discovered problems
with the work, including a driveway that developed soft spots and then
cracked and broke. The parties entered into an agreement to resolve
their disputes and close the project. However, several months later, the
district sued Callahan for breach of contract and negligence. Callahan
asserted counterclaims for additional services it performed. The trial
court stayed the proceedings to allow the parties to arbitrate, as required
in their original contract.
In the arbitration, Callahan sought unpaid fees from the district for
both basic and additional services it alleged it performed on the driveway.
The district sought damages for several matters, including the driveway
and its replacement with concrete, when the original material had been
115. Id. at 494.
116. Callahan & Assoc. v. Orangfield Indep. Sch. Dist., 92 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. 2002).
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less expensive asphalt. The district did not present evidence of the cost to
replace the driveway with asphalt.
The arbitrator denied the district's claims and determined that Calla-
han was entitled to be paid additional fees of almost $90,000. The written
"reasons for award" issued by the arbitrator indicated that the district
could not recover damages for its costs to replace the driveway because,
although both Callahan and the contractor were at fault, there was no
evidence of the cost to replace the driveway with asphalt. Additionally,
the arbitrator determined that Callahan had provided additional services,
and that the agreement entered into at the end of the project did not
require Callahan to perform without additional charge, because the par-
ties did not "effectuate" that agreement. 117
The trial court severed the arbitrated claims from the underlying suit,
and the district filed an application to vacate, modify, or correct the arbi-
tration award. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The
district, in its motion, argued that the arbitrator had exceeded her pow-
ers, made evident mistakes, and violated common law in awarding dam-
ages to Callahan and denying damages to the district. Callahan argued in
its motion that there was no reason to modify the arbitrator's award, and
that the trial court should enter judgment per that award. The trial court
granted Callahan's motion and entered judgment in accordance with the
arbitrator's ruling.118
In the court of appeals, the district argued that the arbitrator made an
"evident mistake and violated common law" by not awarding the district
damages to replace the defective driveway. The court of appeals con-
cluded that the record did contain evidence about the replacement cost to
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the arbitrator
made an evident mistake or violated the common law. 119 The court of
appeals, therefore, reversed the judgment in part, and remanded the case
to the trial court to make findings about the damages to the district. The
court of appeals rejected the district's argument that the award to Calla-
han should be reversed because it found that the district waived its posi-
tion by failing to raise it during the arbitration. 120
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, Callahan requested a reversal
of the court of appeals's decision, based upon its argument that the court
did not have the authority to disturb an arbitration award. The parties
and the court agreed that the Texas Arbitration Act 121 governed the dis-
pute. The court found that the Act requires a court to confirm an arbitra-
tor's award upon a party's application, unless a party offers grounds for
vacating, modifying, or correcting the award.1 22 The court found that the
Act does not allow a reviewing court to modify or correct an award based
117. Id. at 842-43.
118. Id. at 843.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.001.
122. Callahan, 92 S.W.3d at 844 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.087).
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upon an arbitrator's "evident mistake" in failing to award damages, but
rather permits a court to modify or correct an award that contained an
"evident miscalculation of figures" or an "evident mistaken in the
description of a person, thing, or property referred to in the award."'1 23
The court concluded that, because an arbitrator's failure to award dam-
ages is not a ground under the Act for modifying an award, the court of
appeals erred in reversing the summary judgment. 124
B. ARBITRATION RESULTS ARE BINDING, EXCEPT IN
LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
In CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado,125 the Texas Supreme Court once
again emphasized the binding nature of arbitration and refused to reverse
an arbitrator's award, even though a court of appeals found that the
award was erroneous under Texas law.
In the case, the Delgados hired CVN Group to provide construction
services. The written contract between the parties required arbitration of
any disputes. Before construction was completed, the Delgados in-
structed CVN to stop work. CVN alleged that the Delgados had materi-
ally breached the contract and demanded arbitration.
The parties submitted their dispute on documents and briefs, without
live testimony (as agreed upon in the original contract). CVN requested
more than $156,000 in damages plus a lien against the homestead at issue.
The Delgados responded that they did not owe any fees to CVN and that
the lien claimed was invalid because CVN filed its lien affidavit late and
did not record the original contract, as required by the Texas Property
Code. The Delgados did not challenge the arbitrator's authority to de-
cide the lien dispute. The arbitrator awarded CVN more than $110,000 in
damages and found "valid statutory and constitutional mechanic's liens
for the full award."' 26
CVN applied to the district court to confirm the award and foreclose
the mechanic's lien. The Delgados argued that the award should be va-
cated or modified because the award was "manifestly unjust and consti-
tuted usury," there was no evidence that the lien satisfied the necessary
constitutional and statutory requirements, and granting the lien violated
the Delgados' constitutional rights and exceeded the authority of the ar-
bitrator. 127 The trial court found that the award should be reduced to
approximately $23,000 and that CVN was not entitled to foreclose its
mechanic's lien because it had not complied with any of the constitutional
and statutory requirements for obtaining a lien.128 The court of appeals
then reversed the trial court's reduction of the damages, but affirmed the
123. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.091(a)(1)).
124. Id.
125. CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2002).
126. Id. at 235.
127. Id. at 236.
128. Id. at 236-37.
[Vol. 57
Construction and Surety Law
trial court's refusal to foreclose CVN's mechanic's liens, noting that a
mechanic's lien can be foreclosed by judicial action only and that a court
must review the validity of a lien prior to ordering any foreclosure. 129
Factually, the court of appeals determined that CVN had failed to prove
that it had a signed contract with the Delgados, that it had filed the con-
tract in the real property records, and that it had timely filed a lien
affidavit.
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the Delgados argued that a
court has the power to overturn an arbitration award that is unconstitu-
tional or otherwise violates public policy. In the context of its discussion,
the supreme court reviewed Section 171.088(a) of the Texas Arbitration
Act, 130 as well as it prior opinion in Smith v. Gladney,"' which held that a
claim arising out of an illegal transaction is not a legitimate subject of
arbitration and that an award in such a case is void and unenforceable in
courts of law. On both grounds, the court determined that there was no
basis to overturn the arbitration award in question, because there was no
proof of corruption by the arbitrator and no evidence that the transaction
in question was illegal. The court's conclusion makes its point:
Subjecting arbitration awards to judicial review adds expense and de-
lay, thereby diminishing the benefits of arbitration as an efficient,
economical system for resolving disputes. Accordingly, we have long
held that an award of arbitrators upon matters submitted to them is
given the same effect as the judgment of a court of last resort. All
reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of the award, and
none against it.132
Thus, the court concluded that an arbitration award cannot be set aside
on public policy grounds except in an extraordinary case where the award
violated a carefully articulated, fundamental policy. Although the Del-
gados argued that awarding a mechanic's lien on a homestead would sat-
isfy that requirement, the court disagreed, holding that the issues had
been submitted to the arbitrator, and decided in favor of CVN. 133 The
court even stated that nothing in the arbitration proceeding indicated that
the arbitrator completely disregarded the requirements for perfecting
mechanic's liens, although both the trial court and court of appeals found
that decision erroneous. 134
Finally, the court disagreed with the contention in the dissenting opin-
ion that the validity of a mechanic's lien can never be arbitrated, regard-
less of the parties' agreement, as a result of Section 53.154 of the Texas
Property Code, which requires foreclosure only on judgment of a
court. 135 The majority opinion found that nothing in the language or his-
129. Id. at 236 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.154).
130. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
131. Smith v. Gladney, 128 Tex. 354, 98 S.W.2d 351 (1936).
132. CVN Group, Inc., 95 S.W.3d at 238 (citations omitted).





tory of Section 53.154 supporting the dissent's arguments.
This decision presents an extreme set of facts, where it appears that a
contractor did not fulfill the requirements of the Property Code to perfect
a mechanic's lien on a homestead, but was nevertheless permitted to fore-
close that lien. The decision points out the results which parties may face
by agreeing to arbitration, where even an obvious error cannot be cor-
rected by judicial action or otherwise.
C. ARBITRATION CLAUSES STRICTLY ENFORCED
In In re First Texas Homes, Inc.,136 the Texas Supreme Court strictly
enforced the scope of an arbitration agreement between the parties to a
construction contract. The parties in that case entered into a home con-
struction contract which specified that they would arbitrate, under the
Federal Arbitration Act, "all disputes" which arose between them. The
term "dispute" was broadly defined to include all claims, demands, dis-
putes, controversies, and differences of any kind or nature. The home-
owners sued on a number of contractual and tort theories, but also
asserted that the builder had violated the Texas Fair Housing Act and
Federal Fair Housing Act through racial discrimination. The trial court
ordered some, but not all, of the homeowners' claims to arbitration, and
the home builder appealed. The trial court did not require the Fair Hous-
ing claims or an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to be
arbitrated, because those claims arose after the signing of the contract in
question. 137
In the mandamus action, the Texas Supreme Court held that all dis-
putes between the parties, including those claims asserted under the Fair
Housing legislation, and all claims that arose before, during, or after the
contract was signed, were required to be arbitrated pursuant to the broad
clause in the parties' agreement. 138
D. No UNDUE DELAY FOUND IN ARBITRATION DEMAND
In Williams Industries, Inc. v. Earth Development Systems Corp.,139 the
Houston Court of Appeals concluded that a seventeen month delay in
seeking to enforce a right of arbitration was not sufficient to show
prejudice and, therefore, did not waive the right to enforce the arbitration
clause.140 In the case, Earth Development Systems ("EDS"), a subcon-
tractor, filed suit in January 2001, against Williams Industries, the con-
tractor, and other parties for breach of contract and various torts
associated with two separate construction projects. The parties amended
their pleadings and continued to add additional parties over the next
136. In re First Tex. Homes, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2003).
137. Id. at 869.
138. Id. at 870.
139. Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
140. Id. at 139.
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year-and-a-half. Seventeen months after the suit was originally filed, Wil-
liams filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the litigation pursu-
ant to arbitration clauses in the contracts in question. EDS argued that
not all of its claims fell under the arbitration agreements, and that the
contractor had waived the right to arbitrate because of its delay in mak-
ing the request. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration,
but the Houston court reversed in the interlocutory appeal which
followed.
The court noted that, because public policy favors arbitration, there is a
strong presumption against a finding of waiver of the right to arbitrate,
and the burden to prove waiver is a very heavy one.14 1 The court found
that waiver may be express or implied, but that it must be intentional, and
that the following are required to prove waiver: (1) substantial invocation
of the judicial process by the party seeking arbitration and (2) actual
prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.1 4 2
In reviewing the facts of the case, the Houston court concluded that
substantially invoking the judicial process can occur when the requesting
party tried, but failed, to achieve a satisfactory result in litigation before
requesting arbitration, and the court gave an example of an unsuccessful
summary judgment motion. The analysis of prejudice focuses on factors
such as a party's access to information not discoverable in arbitration and
the costs and fees due to a movant's delay.
EDS, which opposed arbitration in the case, relied upon evidence that
Williams had answered a lawsuit, waited seventeen months to request ar-
bitration, engaged in written discovery, filed a cross petition, demanded a
jury and paid a jury fee, and moved for continuances. EDS argued that it
was prejudiced by having to answer discovery and engage in discovery
not permitted in arbitration, incurring costs associated with discovery, not
opposing continuance, and having to pay arbitration fees. In light of
these facts, the court concluded that mere delay and expense alone did
not show prejudice and that EDS had not carried its substantial burden to
establish prejudice.143
E. NON SIGNATORY REQUIRED TO ARBITRATE
The Houston Court of Appeals confirmed that a nonsignatory to a con-
struction contract who relies upon that contract can be required to arbi-
trate, if the parties to the contract are required to arbitrate, in In re
Macgregor.144 In that case, a contractor and subcontractor entered into a
contract relating to the construction of elevators for a cruise ship, which
contained an arbitration clause. The subcontractor made partial pay-
ments to a sub-subcontractor as work proceeded, but did not pay in full.
A payment dispute between the contractor and subcontractor went to
141. Id. at 135.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 141.
144. In re Macgregor, 126 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
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arbitration, and the court held that the sub-subcontractor's related claims
would also be required to be arbitrated.
In its discussion, the court concluded that a nonsignatory to a contract
may be bound by the terms of an arbitration provision of that agreement
if the non-signatory asserts claims that require reliance on the terms of
the agreement. 145 The court focused its analysis of the actions of the non-
signatory, not the relationship to the signatories in reaching its conclusion
that the sub-subcontractor would be required to arbitrate as well. 146 Be-
cause the sub-subcontractor's claims arise out of or touches on matters
covered by the contract between the contractor and subcontractor, the
court concluded that the claims were inextricably intertwined with the
contract dispute and were therefore subject to arbitration as well.147
F. No ARBITRATOR MISCONDUCT FOUND
In Peacock v. Wave Tec Pools, Inc.,148 the Waco Court of Appeals re-
viewed various aspects of a case which had previously been arbitrated.
The homeowners who had contracted for the construction of a pool filed
a petition in the trial court seeking to modify or vacate an arbitration
order. The trial court confirmed the award, and the court of appeals re-
versed in part.
The construction contract between the Peacocks and Wave Tec con-
tained an arbitration clause, and the parties agreed to arbitrate their dis-
agreements regarding the construction of the pool under the rules of the
Better Business Bureau. The Peacocks identified the nature of the dis-
pute by stating that the pool was defective and the workmanship substan-
dard. The decision sought under the rules was identified as "new pool, or
reimbursement of amounts paid, payment by Wave Tec of amount neces-
sary to complete and repair pool." The agreement stated that the arbitra-
tor's decision could not exceed what was specified in the "decision
sought" section. 149
In the underlying arbitration, the arbitrator rendered a decision requir-
ing Wave Tec to repair the pool, subject to the Peacocks' approval. If the
Peacocks did not approve the work, the arbitrator would engage an ex-
pert to review the repairs. The Peacocks were ordered to pay Wave Tec
$10,500 over the contract price for rock removal because of unforeseen
circumstances.
The Peacocks complained that the award was void because it lacked
finality and went beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. The
arbitrator had labeled the award "interim" and established a procedure
to follow, but retained the right to engage an expert to inspect repairs.
145. Id. at 183.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Peacock v. Wave Tec Pools, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, pet.
denied).
149. Id. at 635.
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The Peacocks argued that the award was therefore not final and that a
trial court could not confirm it. The Better Business Bureau rules permit-
ted an arbitrator to issue a final or an interim decision. Based upon those
rules, the court concluded that the arbitrator was permitted to enter the
award he did, that the reserve of authority was ministerial in nature (to
appoint an expert), and that the award did not lack finality. 150
The Waco court also carefully reviewed the scope of the arbitration
agreement and the agreement on the scope of the award to be made in
order to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The
court noted that the Peacocks had requested a new pool or reimburse-
ment of amounts paid and payment by Wave Tec to complete the pool.
The court concluded that ordering Wave Tec to repair the pool at its own
expense was within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, but that the
issue regarding compensation for additional rock work was not because
Wave Tec did not specifically identify that issue in the agreement. 151
Finally, the Waco court concluded that the arbitrator's actions in solic-
iting advice from technical experts without including the parties did not
constitute "misconduct" which would require the vacation of the arbitra-
tion award. The court held that the level of misconduct required would
be that to deprive the parties of a fair hearing and that no such evidence
existed. 152
VII. CONTRACTOR LIABILITY FOR
SUBCONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEES
As discussed in prior articles, the Texas Supreme Court during 2001
and 2002, had the opportunity to analyze in some detail the prerequisites
for holding a contractor liable for the negligence of a subcontractor's em-
ployees. In Lee Lewis Construction, Inc. v. Harrison153 and Dow Chemi-
cal Co. v. Bright,15 4 the court outlined the elements of control which the
court required in order to find liability of a contractor for acts of a sub-
contractor's employees.
During 2003, the Austin Court of Appeals had the opportunity to apply
those principles in its decision in Qwest Communications Int'l, Inc. v.
AT&T Corp.155 The facts in the Qwest case involved the construction of
nationwide fiber-optic communications networks by Qwest, in order to
compete against AT&T and other companies. In 1996, Qwest was laying
fiber optic cable in highway right-of-ways between Austin, San Antonio,
and Houston. AT&T's fiber-optic cables already in existence were also
buried in the same rights-of-way. Qwest informed AT&T of its activities,
150. Id. at 637.
151. Id. at 639.
152. Id. at 640.
153. Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2001).
154. Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2002).
155. Qwest Communications Int'l, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 114 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2003, pet. filed).
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and AT&T had representatives on site to aid in the coordination of the
efforts and to mark the AT&T cables to prevent damage to them.
In order to conduct the required work, Qwest hired C&S Directional
Boring Company, Inc. ("C&S") as a subcontractor, and C&S hired a
company called CK Directional Drilling as its subcontractor. On Septem-
ber 16, 1997, Qwest severed one of AT&T's cables. In October and De-
cember 1997, CK severed the cable a second and third time. AT&T filed
suit against Qwest and C&S seeking damages and other relief. At trial,
the District Court in Travis County awarded economic and exemplary
damages to AT&T. On appeal, Qwest argued that it should not have
been held liable for the acts of C&S and CK.
At trial, the district court submitted four questions to the jury concern-
ing whether C&S was under Qwest's control and whether CK was under
C&S's control during the construction and second and third cuts. With
respect to the second and third cuts, the questions submitted to the jury
included (1) whether C&S was "conducting operations for the benefit of
Qwest and subject to the control by Qwest as to the detail of the work"
and (2) whether CK was "conducting operations for the benefit of C&S
Boring and subject to control by C&S Boring as to the details of its
work. ' 156 Qwest made two arguments on appeal: (1) because AT&T did
not request a question as to whether Qwest controlled the details of CK's
work and the questions did not submit a respondeat superior theory for
CK, AT&T waived the theory as between Qwest and CK; and (2) the
evidence as to the contractors' lack of independence was legally and fac-
tually sufficient.
The Austin Court of Appeals began its discussion with the general rule
that an employer or owner is not liable for the acts of its independent
contractors, citing various cases. 15 7 The court specified that for a general
contractor to be liable for its independent contractor's acts, it must have
the right to control the means, methods, or details of the work.15 8 The
court also specified that the control must relate to the injury the negli-
gence causes, and the contract must grant the contractor at least the
power to direct the order in which work is performed.159
The court of appeals's first concluded that the evidence presented was
sufficient to support the judgment of liability of Qwest, finding evidence
of both actual control and the contractual right to control. 160 The court
noted that C&S contractually retained some control over CK's work, and
CK personnel exercised some oversight with regard to C&S's operations.
C&S retained the right to control CK's hiring decisions in its contract.
CK and C&S shared equipment, and the court noted that there was no
practical difference between CK and C&S. In addition, the court found
156. Id. at 34.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 2001)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 35.
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that Qwest's contract specified that Qwest had the right to direct and
control C&S, including details of the work, and that Qwest exercised such
control.
The court also rejected Qwest's theory regarding jury questions, hold-
ing that where issues that constitute only a part of a complete and inde-
pendent ground are omitted and other issues necessarily referable to that
ground are submitted and answered, the omitted elements are deemed
found in support of the judgment if no objection to the omitted elements
is made, and the answers are supported by some evidence. 161 The court
noted that it was AT&T's burden to obtain an affirmative finding of
Qwest's control over CK, but that it was Qwest's burden to object to the
omission. Because Qwest did not object, and because the omitted issue
constituted only a part of a complete and independent ground of recov-
ery, the other evidence at trial supporting the finding. 162 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court judgment, concluding that the evidence
supported a finding that Qwest controlled C&S, that C&S controlled CK,
and that Qwest controlled CK. 163
VIII. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LIABILITY ACT
In 2003, there were few opinions interpreting the Residential Construc-
tion Liability Act ("RCLA"). However, both the Austin and San
Antonio courts addressed various aspects of the Act.
A. THE RCLA GOVERNS ALL RESIDENTIAL
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
In F&S Construction, Inc. v. Saidi,164 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals addressed the question of whether a homeowner is required to spe-
cifically plead the Residential Construction Liability Act in order to
recover under that statute. In September 1997, the Saidis executed a con-
tract with F&S Construction for the construction of a new home. After
they determined that they were not satisfied with the quality of the work
performed, the Saidis terminated the contract with F&S. In December
1998, F&S sued the Saidis for money owed under the contract. The Saidis
filed an answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged breach of
contract, fraud, and DTPA claims, and requested damages and attorneys'
fees. In May 2002, two weeks before trial, F&S filed a verified plea in
abatement, arguing that the Saidis had not complied with the RCLA be-
cause they had not provided reasonable specificity of the construction
defects alleged in the counterclaim and had not provided an opportunity
for the contractor to view the property. Both parties further amended
their pleadings before trial.
161. Id. at 36 (citing TEX. R. CIv. PROC. 279).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 46.
164. F&S Constr., Inc. v. Saidi, No. 04-02-00649-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 10769, at
*1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 24, 2003, no pet. h.).
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A jury awarded the Saidis more than $170,000 in damages and attor-
neys' fees. F&S appealed the denial of its plea in abatement and argued
that the evidence was not sufficient to support the findings that the Saidis
gave F&S reasonable detail of the defects and an opportunity to inspect
the home.
The court began its analysis with a general description of the RCLA,
noting that all claims to recover damages resulting from construction of a
residence fall within the purview of the RCLA. 165 The court also pointed
out the requirement that a claimant must give sixty days written notice of
claims before filing suit, although that requirement does not apply in the
case of a counterclaim. 66 In lieu of that notice requirement, a counter-
claimant is required to specify, in reasonable detail in his pleading, each
construction defect which is the subject of the claims. 167 While the court
noted that the statute does not specify what language constitutes reasona-
ble detail of the defects, the purpose of the notice is to encourage pre-suit
negotiations and to avoid the expense of litigation. 168
In the Saidis' pleadings, the homeowners alleged problems with four
separate scopes of work, and later supplemented that description with
fourteen detailed complaints. In the context of the case of first impres-
sion, the court concluded that the four separate categories which were
described were sufficient to provide F&S with notice of the alleged de-
fects. Because the jury's findings were supported by more than a scintilla
of evidence, the court of appeals upheld the jury's findings.169 The court
also found evidence in the record that the homeowners did permit an
inspection of the property, satisfying the requirement under the
statute. 170
B. THE RCLA PERMITS ADR OTHER THAN MEDIATION
In High Valley Homes, Inc. v Fudge,171 the court determined that the
parties to a residential construction contract can agree to forms of alter-
native dispute resolution other than mediation, even in light of the provi-
sions of the RCLA. 172 Mr. and Mrs. Fudge entered into a contract with
High Valley Homes for the construction of a home. During construction,
with input from their architect, the Fudges terminated the contract with
High Valley as a result of construction defects. The Fudges filed suit for
declaratory judgment seeking to invalidate a mechanic's lien filed by
High Valley and for damages under the DTPA. High Valley answered
that the case was governed by the RCLA and that the Fudges had failed
165. Id. at *5-6.
166. Id. at *6-7 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004(c)).
167. Id. at *7.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *9.
170. Id.
171. High Valley Homes, Inc. v. Fudge, No. 03-01-00726-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS
3273 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 17, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).
172. Id. at *7.
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to provide sufficient notice of alleged defects. Later, High Valley also
filed a motion to require mediation, arguing that the contract contained a
mediation clause and that the Fudges had failed to mediate the case.
During the hearing on that motion, the parties were ordered to partici-
pate in arbitration. Following the arbitration of all claims, the Fudges
received judgment in their favor. High Valley appealed on various
grounds, including a claim that the trial court erred in requiring arbitra-
tion when High Valley requested mediation and the contract and the
RCLA permitted mediation.
The court concluded that the RCLA authorizes, but does not require,
mediation by the parties. 173 High Valley argued that the Fudges' claims
did fall within the scope of the RCLA, and because the RCLA calls for
mediation, the court erred in requiring arbitration. The court rejected the
concept that because the RCLA refers to mediation the RCLA would
displace otherwise binding agreements entered into by the parties.
17 4
The court concluded that, if the legislature had intended for mediation
provided for in the statute to preempt private contracts and other ADR
methods, it would have plainly stated that rule.
175
IX. THE SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE DOCTRINE
In 2002, the appellate courts addressed two separate interesting cases
on the doctrine of substantial performance and its relationship to a
party's ability to sue for breach of a construction contract.
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION AND
JURY FINDINGS
In Movie Grill Concepts I, Ltd. v. CCM Group, Inc.,1 7 6 the Dallas
Court of Appeals addressed the question of possibly conflicting jury find-
ings on the issues of substantial completion and breach of contract.
Movie Grill contracted with CCM to renovate a movie theater, and the
parties signed an original contract and various change orders. CCM sued
Movie Grill, alleging that CCM substantially performed, but that Movie
Grill failed to pay all that was owed on the contract. CCM alleged that it
was owed more than $310,000 after allowing for credits and offsets. CCM
filed claims for breach of contract, sworn account, quantum meruit, and
fraud, among others. Movie Grill counterclaimed, alleging that CCM
failed to complete the renovation for the agreed price and failed to per-
form in a good and workmanlike manner, thus breaching the contract. 177
The jury found that both CCM and Movie Grill breached the contract,
that Movie Grill was excused from compliance with the agreements be-
173. Id. at *6.
174. Id. at *7.
175. Id.
176. Movie Grill Concepts I, Ltd. v. CCM Group, Inc., No. 05-02-00892-CV, 2003 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1752, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 27, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
177. Id. at *2-3.
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cause of CCM's material breach, that CCM substantially performed, and
that the value of the performance was $70,445. Movie Grill appealed,
arguing that the trial court erred in entering judgment for CCM because
the jury's finding that CCM substantially performed was irrelevant in
light of the finding that Movie Grill was excused from further
performance.
A careful review of the factual findings by the jury would raise some
questions regarding the consistency of the findings, but the court of ap-
peals found that it was required to reconcile apparent conflicts in the
findings if reasonably possible in light of the pleadings and evidence. In
response to question 1, the jury found that both CCM and Movie Grill
failed to comply with the agreements. In question 3, the jury found that
Movie Grill's failure to comply was excused by CCM's failure to comply
with material obligations of the agreement. In question 9, the jury found
that CCM had substantially performed under the contract. CCM argued
that nothing in the record showed that questions 3 and 9 addressed the
same facts, and the Dallas court agreed that it could not say, as a matter
of law, that the findings were in conflict. 178
Movie Grill also argued that a finding of material breach by CCM pre-
cluded recovery on a substantial performance theory. The court held that
the substantial performance doctrine is a doctrine that allows breaching
parties who have substantially completed their obligations to recover on a
contract.179 The court specifically referred to the doctrine that when a
contractor had substantially performed a building contract, he is entitled
to recover the contract price less the cost to remedy the defects that can
be remedied. The court then found that that issues of remediable defects
were addressed in two additional questions, where the jury found that
there were no damages to Movie Grill based upon CCM's breach of the
contract. As a result, the court upheld the jury verdict.180
B. THE IMPACT OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION
In Celtic Constructors, Inc. v. Van Pelt,18 1 the Houston Court of Ap-
peals addressed the question of whether a party who only substantially
complies with a construction contract can sue for breach of contract. The
Van Pelts entered into a construction contract with Celtic to remodel a
home. Celtic stopped work before the job was completed because it al-
leged that the Van Pelts had stopped paying as agreed. Celtic sued the
Van Pelts for breach of contract and quantum meruit. The Van Pelts
counterclaimed, arguing that Celtic had not performed in a good and
workmanlike manner. The trial court granted Celtic's motion for sum-
178. Id. at *7.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *9.
181. Celtic Constructors, Inc. v. Van Pelt, No. 01-02-00012-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS
8861, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 12, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for
publication).
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mary judgment on the counterclaims, and Celtic's claims were tried
before a jury. The court granted the Van Pelts' motion for a directed
verdict on the issue of breach of contract. The jury, proceeding on the
quantum meruit claim, found that the Van Pelts failed to comply with the
agreement and that the reasonable value of the work performed by Celtic
was $56,570.
With respect to the breach of contract action, the court held that a
party to a contract who is in default generally cannot maintain a suit for
breach. 182 The court recognized the exception to the rule in the context
of construction projects, where a party can establish that it has substan-
tially completed work on the project.183 In that claim, the contractor has
the burden of proving that it did substantially perform.1 84
Because it was uncontroverted that Celtic did not complete the con-
tract, the only contract cause of action at trial could have been substantial
performance. However, Celtic did not plead substantial performance.
The court, therefore, concluded that the evidence that Celtic did not com-
plete the contract, along with the fact that it failed to plead substantial
performance, conclusively negated Celtic's right to judgment on a breach
of contract claim. 185
C. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION VERSUS MATERIAL BREACH
In Continental Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc.,' 86 the Texarkana
Court of Appeals addressed questions of good and workmanlike con-
struction, as well as the doctrine of substantial completion in the context
of an allegation of material breach. De-Kaizered hired Continental
Dredging to dredge to a uniform depth of thirty-six feet in front of its
dock in the Houston ship channel. Continental sued De-Kaizered for
payment on the contract, and De-Kaizered defended with allegations that
Continental breached the agreement, breached warranties, and violated
the DTPA. The jury awarded Continental contract damages for $123,556,
offset by an award of $56,485 to De-Kaizered for Continental's breach of
warranty. Continental appealed, arguing that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support damages under the DTPA and the breach of warranty
theory. The facts regarding the dredging performed were disputed.
The court confirmed that a mere breach of contract does not constitute
a violation of the DTPA and that the evidence did not support a finding
of a DTPA violation. 187 In addition, the court determined that the con-
tract between the parties included an implied warranty of good and work-
manlike construction and that Continental was required to perform its
182. Id. at *8.
183. Id. (citing Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San Antonio, Inc., 677 S.W.2d
480, 481 (Tex. 1984)).
184. Id. at *9.
185. Id. at *10.
186. Continental Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-Tex-
arkana 2003, pet. denied).
187. Id. at 389.
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work in a manner generally considered proficient by one with knowledge
and experience in the trade. Because the jury found that Continental
breached the contract, the court found that there was evidence that Con-
tinental failed to perform in a good and workmanlike manner and, there-
fore, breached the implied warranty.
Finally, the court noted that De-Kaizered failed to submit a question to
the jury regarding whether the breach was a material breach. The jury
did find that De-Kaizered was not excused from its payment obligation.
Implicitly, then, the jury found that there was no material breach, and the
court determined that there was substantial performance and no dis-
charge of De-Kaizered's payment obligation. 188
X. CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS AND INSURANCE COVERAGE
The question of whether an alleged construction defect can ever qualify
as an "occurrence" and trigger an insurer's duty to defend and/or duty to
indemnify in favor of the insured in the context of a commercial liability
policy continues to be a subject of discussion by the Texas courts. While
the courts have struggled with such questions, the most recent decisions
make it clear that the Texas state courts are reluctant to expand coverage
to include damages for defective work performed by the insured contrac-
tor itself, as opposed to defective work by a subcontractor or as opposed
to "resulting damage" to a third party's work.
A. THE CONTRACTOR'S DEFECTIVE WORK is NOT
AN "OCCURRENCE"
During 2003, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas had the opportunity to apply Texas law in a dispute over general
liability insurance and its application in the context of a construction pro-
ject. In Jim Johnson Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,189 Jim
Johnson Homes instituted a declaratory judgment action seeking to im-
pose an obligation to defend upon Mid-Continent under a liability policy.
The plaintiff home builder was involved in underlying litigation with
homeowners who had hired Jim Johnson Homes to construct a residence.
Mid-Continent defended, arguing that the claims by the homeowners did
not qualify for coverage because they did not allege "property damage"
caused by an "occurrence" and because exclusions relating to damage to
property on which the insured was working applied.
The allegations of the homeowners included claims that the foundation
and other scopes of the work were not constructed in accordance with the
plans and specifications. The homeowners notified Jim Johnson Homes
that it was in material breach of the contract, and Jim Johnson stopped
work. The homeowners terminated the contract, but only after they no-
188. Id. at 394-95.
189. Jim Johnson Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 706 (N.D.
Tex. 2003).
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ticed cracking in the foundation, which the owners' engineers opined was
caused by improper foundation construction. The homeowners filed
claims against Jim Johnson for breach of contract, fraud, and violations of
the DTPA. 190
The policy in question contained standard coverage language which
provided that the policy would pay "sums that the insured becomes le-
gally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . 'property damage' to
which [the] insurance applies." 191 After reviewing various pleadings, the
court determined that the duty to defend was ripe for adjudication and
that no allegations contained in the homeowners' claims could possibly
trigger coverage under the liability policy. 192 The court applied the well-
accepted rules regarding the interpretation of "occurrence" and "prop-
erty damage," as well as the exceptions dealing with work performed by
the insured. The court referred to the recent decision in Hatrick v. Great
American Lloyds Insurance Company,193 discussed in last year's article,
in support of its conclusions.
B. MOLD AND INSURANCE COVERAGE
In December 2002, the Austin Court of Appeals had the opportunity to
review a trial court's award of more than $32 million in damages to a
homeowner in a mold case. In Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchange,194 the
court reviewed the claims of Mary Ballard against Fire Insurance Ex-
change ("FIE"), a member of the Farmers Insurance Group. The claim
originally arose as a single claim for water damage to a hardwood floor,
but evolved into a mold contamination case affecting the entire structure
and outbuildings. FIE argued on appeal that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support the jury's finding of liability. The court of
appeals determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the
evidentiary ruling about which FIE complained. 195 The court further
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's finding
that FIE breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing and that FIE
violated the DTPA, but there was insufficient evidence to support the
holding of fraud, failure to appoint a competent appraiser, and knowing
violations of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.1 96 The court, there-
fore, affirmed the actual damages award of more than $4 million, but
reversed the judgment for punitive and mental anguish damages.197
190. Id. at 709-11.
191. Id. at 712.
192. Id at 714.
193. Hatrick v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 62 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
194. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet.
withdrawn).
195. Id. at 233.




The home at issue was purchased by the plaintiff in 1990 at a foreclo-
sure sale, and FIE began to insure it in 1992. Within a couple of years
before the claims at issue, which began in 1998, the home had some
plumbing leaks. In 1996 and 1997, Ballard filed claims for plumbing leaks
caused by frozen pipes. Plumbing leaks continued, although the next
claim was not filed until 1998. Ballard continued to notice buckling and
problems with the floors throughout 1998. On December 17, 1998, Bal-
lard filed an insurance claim for the water damage to the hardwood
floors. An outside adjuster opined that the damage was caused by a
foundation issue and that the damages were not covered by the insurance
policy. He later reconsidered and requested additional tests. The FIE
adjuster estimated the claim to be around $100,000. Ballard's estimates
for repairs ranged from $89,000 to $171,000.
The FIE adjuster and an engineer visited the home in January 1999, to
inspect the damage. The engineer found two sources of moisture: a bath-
room and around the refrigerator. The adjuster later sent a letter to Bal-
lard noting that plumbing tests had been performed but had not located
any leaks. Moisture tests continued to show high levels of moisture in the
hardwood floors. Following a new appraisal of the property, FIE in-
creased the level of coverage for the home to $750,000 and the contents
to $450,000. FIE requested additional time to continue its investigation.
Ballard hired an attorney.
In February 1999, FIE paid approximately $108,000 for the claim for
accidental water discharge damage to the floor. In March, FIE reviewed
newly discovered damage to the floors. In April, Ballard began to sus-
pect that there might be a mold problem and had testing performed. The
tests did report the presence of mold, and the family moved out of the
residence. FIE paid additional damages for claims in April 1999. In May
1999, Ballard filed suit against FIE for breach of contract, deceptive trade
practices, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
negligence.1 98
At trial, the jury awarded $2.5 million to replace the home, $1.1 million
to remediate the home, $2 million to replace the contents of the home,
$350,000 for living expenses, and $176,000 for appraisal fees, plus $5 mil-
lion in mental anguish, $12 million in punitive damages, and more than $8
million in attorneys' fees. 199 FIE filed multiple issues on appeal, the most
significant of which are discussed below.
On appeal, the court determined that the trial court had not erred in
excluding a causation witness, because the party seeking to offer the testi-
mony of the witness did not establish a reliable foundation for the admis-
sion of the general causation evidence.2 00 The court also carefully
reviewed all of the evidence presented in making its determination that
there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of a breach of the
198. Id. at 236.
199. Id. at 237.
200. Id. at 240.
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duty of good faith and fair dealing, stating that the legal standard that
such a breach occurs is when the claim is denied or payment is delayed
when "the insurer's liability has become reasonably clear."'201
XI. PASS THROUGH CLAIMS
In Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas,20 2 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Texas Supreme Court certain
questions related to "pass through" claims. The City of Dallas entered
into a contract with Interstate Contracting Corporation ("ICC") on a
fixed sum basis for the construction of levees around a water treatment
plant and related work. ICC entered into two subcontracts with Mine
Services, Inc. ("MSI") for certain of the work. MSI was forced to manu-
facture material by mixing sand with limited quantities of clay to have
suitable material for the work, which substantially increased the costs as-
sociated with the job. The contract was silent as to the issue of manufac-
turing fill material. ICC informed the city of MSI's increased work, but
the city indicated it would deny any claim for additional compensation
because the work performed was beyond the scope of the contract. The
contract between ICC and MSI provided that ICC was given the sole
discretion to bring a claim against the city on behalf of MSI at MSI's
expense. ICC did file suit against the city on behalf of MSI.
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas allowed ICC to
bring the claims on behalf of MSI. On appeal, the city argued that the
judgment was in error, because there was a lack of privity between the
subcontractor and city. ICC argued that, even though there was a lack of
privity, the court correctly permitted ICC to present MSI's claims on a
pass through basis. While the court of appeals found support for actions
against the federal government for pass through claims, it found no Texas
authority for claims against a state entity, Accordingly, the court of ap-
peals certified to the Texas Supreme Court a question to determine
"[djoes Texas law recognize pass-through claims, i.e., may a contractor
assert a claim on behalf of its subcontractor against the owner when there
is no privity of contract between the subcontractor and the owner. '20 3
XII. PERFORMANCE BONDS AND THE MATERIAL
ALTERATION DOCTRINE
In Cumberland Casualty & Surety Company v. Nkwazi,20 4 the Austin
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a surety's obligations under its
bond, in the face of the surety's argument that it had been wholly dis-
charged by the actions of the owner, by reason of the material alteration
201. Id. at 248 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, 4(10)(a)(11) (Vernon Supp.
2003); Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Tex. 1997)).
202. Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas, 320 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2003).
203. Id. at 545.
204. Cumberland Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Nkwazi, No. 03-02-00270-CV, 2003 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4902, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin June 12, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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doctrine. The underlying facts of the case involved a company called
Nkwazi, which hired Salinas Construction to build a Comfort Inn motel.
Comfort Inn gave Nkwazi guidelines for the motel's construction, and
Nkwazi hired an architect who drafted drawings to be used for the bid
process and construction. In 1997, Nkwazi sent out the plans for bidding
and later accepted the bid submitted by Salinas. Nkwazi and Salinas
signed a two-page proposal, which Nkwazi maintained was the only con-
tract between the parties. Nkwazi's lender required the project to be
bonded, so Cumberland issued a performance bond for Salinas's work on
the project.
After repeated problems between Nkwazi and Salinas, Nkwazi de-
clared Salinas in default and made a demand upon the performance
bond. Cumberland refused coverage, and Nkwazi filed suit against Cum-
berland. After a jury trial, the court granted judgment in favor of Nkwazi
for damages and attorneys' fees. Cumberland appealed, arguing that the
jury's findings were against the great weight of evidence.20 5
Cumberland did not dispute in the case that it did not perform under
the bond in question. Rather, Cumberland argued that its obligations
under the bond were completely discharged as a result of Nkwazi's mate-
rial alteration of the bonded contract. The material alteration which
Cumberland pled was that Nkwazi failed to hire an architect to inspect
Salinas' work, which led to substantial overpayment for faulty work
which was performed. Cumberland argued that proper payment to Sali-
nas under the contract was a condition precedent to its obligations under
the bond.
Questions 2 and 3 submitted to the jury in the case both asked whether
Cumberland's non-performance was excused by Nkwazi's failure to sat-
isfy conditions precedent. The bond itself, which followed Form A312 of
the American Institute of Architects' forms, set forth the requirements
for bond performance. In particular, the bond required that there be no
"Owner Default." If no default occurred, the bond provided that the
surety's obligations to perform would arise. Paragraph 12.4 of the con-
tract in question provided that "Owner Default" would include "[failure]
of the Owner, which has neither been remedied nor waived, to pay the
Contractor as required by the Construction Contract or to perform and
complete or comply with the other terms thereof. '206
Nkwazi argued that it was not in default because the contract did not
specifically require an architect to be hired to inspect the construction,
and further, that the only contract in existence was the bid proposal by
Salinas, not a longer form contract as required by the bid. Cumberland
responded that the bid proposal required the parties to execute an AIA
standard form contract, and that Nkwazi should be held to the AIA pro-
vision which required an architect to be employed.
The Austin court noted that it could reverse only if the jury's answers
205. Id. at *1-2.
206. Id. at *34.
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were against the great weight of the evidence. 20 7 In reviewing the evi-
dence, the court noted that construction began in April 1997, and that
Nkwazi paid Salinas progress payments. Salinas failed to follow the con-
struction plans and defects became apparent as the work progressed.
Salinas remedied some but not all of the problems. Nkwazi admitted that
it did not have an architect inspect the progress of the construction during
the work, but the testimony also indicated that Nkwazi did not know of
any such requirement to hire an architect for that purpose. Even after
various meetings and plans to remedy problems, Salinas continued to ex-
perience difficulties in performing the requirements of the contract.
The court found, based upon the evidence in the record, that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.208 The court noted that
there was conflicting evidence in the record regarding the proposal, as
well as the contents of the contract. While the bid anticipated that the
parties would sign an AIA contract, the owners testified that there was no
separate contract and that they were not aware that a separate contract
was required. Cumberland's file contained the proposal, but no AIA
contract form. Based upon all of that evidence, the court concluded that
the jury's verdict was not manifestly unjust. 20 9 The court found that
Cumberland issued the bond without requiring the parties to sign an AIA
contract. Because there was no AIA contract, the court held that Cum-
berland's position that there had been a material alteration of the AIA
contract could not be sustained. The court refused to apply the material
alteration as a result of overpayment rule stated in Old Colony Insurance
Co. v. City of Quitman.210
XIII. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. THE PROPERTY CODE
One change to the Texas Property Code and its provisions in Chapter
53 pertaining to liens instituted in 2003 was the addition of the provision
which permits a person who furnishes labor or materials for the demoli-
tion of a structure on real property by a written contract with the owner
or the owner's agent a mechanic's lien on the property.211
B. LEGISLATION IMPACTING RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION
The legislation affecting residential construction which took effect in
2003 included changes to the Texas Property Code and the RCLA. First,
the legislature enacted the Texas Residential Construction Commission
Act, which created the Texas Residential Construction Commission, state
sponsored inspection and dispute resolution, and warranties and building
207. Id. at *6.
208. Id. at *9-10.
209. Id. at *12.
210. Old Colony Ins. Co. v. City of Quitman, 163 Tex. 144, 352 S.W.2d 452 (1961).
211. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021(e) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
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performance standards. That legislation is now Title 16 to the Texas
Property Code. In addition, the legislature amended certain provisions to
the RCLA, including the definitions section2 12 and various sections per-
taining to relief which is available under the Act. 213
212. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.001 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
213. Id. at §§ 27.003, 27.004.
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